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Although there is a large body of research devoted to the issue of the determinants of welfare
caseloads, none of these studies has incorporated the effects of child support. Given that stronger child
support enforcement is expected to reduce caseloads by deterring entrances and promoting exits from
welfare and by deterring divorce and nonmarital births, this is a surprising and potentially serious
omission. We employ annual state panel data from 1980 to 1996 first to replicate previous models and
then to incorporate the effects of child support. We find support for the hypothesis that strong child
support enforcement decreases welfare caseloads.Child Support and Welfare Caseloads
I. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of increasing rates of nonmarital births and divorces, the proportion of
American families with children that are headed by single mothers rose sharply in the last quarter of the
century. One of every eight families with children was headed by a single mother in 1970. By 1996, the
proportion had doubled to one of every four. Unfortunately, the economic insecurity of single-mother
families remains dangerously high. Nearly half are poor and another quarter are near-poor (below 200
percent of the poverty line) (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998).
The rising number of single-mother families and their persistent disadvantage have increased
public and political concerns over the roles of welfare and child support. In response to the increase of
divorced and never-married mothers in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) caseloads, state
and federal legislators have taken a number of steps to prevent nonresident fathers from abandoning their
children financially and to increase the responsibility of resident mothers (see Garfinkel, Meyer, and
McLanahan, 1998, for a brief history). In 1975, Congress created the Child Support Enforcement (CSE)
Program, which established state offices of CSE and authorized federal matching funds for states to help
locate absent parents, establish paternity, institute child support orders, and obtain child support
payments. From 1981 through 1999, Congress passed new laws every year (with the exception of 1983,
1985, and 1991) strengthening child support (Lerman and Sorenson, 2000). The 1984, 1988, and 1996
bills were the most important. The 1984 Child Support Amendments required states to develop legislative
guidelines for determining child support awards and to withhold child support obligations from the
paychecks of delinquent fathers. In 1988, the Family Support Act mandated states to adopt presumptive
guidelines for child support awards and to initiate automatic withholding from fathers’ paychecks,
regardless of delinquency. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 reinforced paternity establishment by streamlining the legal processes for2
establishment, requiring states to adopt in-hospital voluntary paternity establishment programs, and
making genetic testing mandatory in contested cases. It also strengthened income withholding by
reducing the time for employers to remit withheld wages to 7 business days and allowing issuance of
electronic withholding orders by state agencies without notice to obligors. The collection system will
change from one in which payment is often discretionary to one in which payment is compelled and
automatic (Legler, 1996).
State and federal legislators also have passed a series of proposals designed to reduce the welfare
eligibility of single mothers and increase the costs of single motherhood. These initiatives included a
series of welfare waivers in the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s that lowered welfare benefits,
imposed work requirements, and limited eligibility. This trend culminated in PRWORA, which replaced
AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), eliminated the entitlement to welfare,
substantially tightened work requirements, and limited total lifetime eligibility to 5 years.
Large fluctuations in average monthly AFDC-Basic caseloads over the past 20 years have
spawned a round of welfare caseload studies. The average monthly caseload was around 3.6 million
between 1975 and 1981 and then, despite the severe recession in 1981–82, declined to 3.2 million in
1982. Most analysts attribute this drop to the reductions in welfare eligibility enacted by the 1981
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). Between 1982 and 1990 caseloads rose slowly but steadily
to 3.8 million. In response to the recession of the early 1990s, caseloads increased from 3.8 million in
1990 to 4.6 million in 1994. After 1994, caseloads began an unprecedented decrease to 4.1 million in
1996 and 2.9 million as of the end of 1998. Numerous studies have found that the changes in
demographics, macroeconomic conditions, political party, and AFDC program characteristics help to
account for the changes over time (CBO, 1993; CEA, 1997; Ziliak et al., 1997; Blank, 1997; Moffitt,
1992, 1999; Wallace and Blank, 1999; Figlio and Ziliak, 1999).
What is missing from these studies of welfare caseloads is the effect of child support. Both
reductions in welfare benefits and increases in child support will decrease welfare caseloads. Perhaps3
because direct effects are more obvious and easier to document than are indirect effects, academic studies
as well as the popular media have paid more attention to changes in welfare policies than to changes in
child support policies in accounting for changes in welfare caseloads. For a number of reasons, this
omission is both surprising and regrettable. First, policymakers strengthened child support enforcement in
the belief that doing so would improve collections and thereby reduce welfare costs and caseloads.
Second, there is evidence that child support enforcement has improved collections, especially among
fathers whose children are likely to be on welfare. Third, as we show below, there are good reasons to
expect, and fairly strong empirical evidence to support the belief, that strong child support enforcement
will reduce welfare caseloads. Finally, cuts in welfare benefits and increases in child support payments
both decrease welfare caseloads, but the former reduces the economic well-being of single-mother
families while the latter increases it. Thus, previous studies of welfare caseloads are incomplete.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that strong child support collection is associated with lower
welfare caseloads. Most of our models indicate that states with effective child support collection have
significantly lower welfare caseloads, suggesting that future caseload studies should incorporate the
effects of child support. In the next section, the theory and empirical evidence that motivate our analysis
are discussed. In the third and fourth sections, we describe our analytical methods and data. After that, the
effects of child support on welfare caseloads are presented. In the final section we discuss our results and
their implications for policy and for future research.
II. THE MULTIPLE EFFECTS OF CHILD SUPPORT ON WELFARE CASELOADS: THEORY
AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Simple descriptive statistics suggest that child support enforcement has been very successful in
increasing child support payments from the fathers of children receiving welfare. From 1980 to 1996,
according to data reported by the 50 state offices of child support enforcement and compiled by the
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), the proportion of single mothers who were on4
welfare and had a child support payment tripled—from 14 percent to 42 percent. Although the data we
compiled from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) differ, in those data too the proportion
nearly tripled—from 9 percent to 26 percent. The differences in levels reported by the OCSE and CPS are
important and will be discussed below, but they should not obscure the fact that both data sources indicate
dramatic improvement over time. Nor should the very modest improvements in the payment rate for all
children obscure the dramatic improvement for children on welfare. According to the CPS the proportion
of all single mothers (both those receiving welfare and those not) receiving child support increased
between 1980 and 1996 only from 28 percent to 35 percent. Though federal and state offices of child
support enforcement in principle are supposed to serve welfare and nonwelfare cases, the focus of
legislators and bureaucrats has been on welfare cases. Thus a much larger improvement for welfare cases
is to be expected. Furthermore, as documented in Hanson et al. (1996), the child support enforcement
system has been forced to swim upstream due to increases in the proportion of single mothers who are
unwed and declines in real wages of nonresident fathers (see also Sorensen and Halpern, 1999). Unlike
divorce and separation cases, unwed cases require that paternity be established before a child support
order can be secured. Declines in real wages reduce nonresident fathers’ ability to pay support. Finally, a
number of academic studies document a link between specific child support enforcement laws and
increases in child support payments (Garfinkel and Klawitter, 1990; Beller and Graham, 1993; Garfinkel
and Robins, 1994; Freeman and Waldfogel, 1998; Sorensen and Halpern, 1999). In short, legislation to
strengthen child support enforcement has succeeded in increasing child support payments from fathers of
children on welfare.
Child support enforcement can decrease welfare caseloads both by reducing the proportion of
single mothers who receive welfare and by reducing the prevalence of single mothers. Strong child
support enforcement reduces the proportion of single mothers who will rely on welfare both by increasing
the economic security of mothers outside welfare and by being more complementary to work. Increases in
child support increase the mother’s income and thereby reduce her need and eligibility for welfare.5
Compared with welfare, child support is more complementary to work because as the mother’s earnings
increase, child support payments fall much less rapidly than welfare benefits, and in many states child
support does not decline at all. A number of studies document that child support reduces poverty and
welfare caseloads effectively (Robins and Dickinson, 1985; Robins, 1986; Garfinkel et al., 1990; Meyer
et al., 1991). In terms of flows into and out of welfare, two studies (Meyer, 1993, and Huang, Kunz, and
Garfinkel, 2000) using longitudinal data find that child support payments have significant effects on the
probability of leaving AFDC and the probability of re-entering AFDC.
Though economic theory does not yield general conclusions about the effects of strong child
support enforcement on nonmarital births or divorce, theory suggests that in the presence of a welfare
system, deterrence effects are likely. Stronger enforcement increases the income of the custodial or
resident parent and reduces the income of the nonresident parent. To simplify, yet account for most cases,
we call resident parents mothers and nonresident parents fathers. If child support enforcement is tougher,
mothers will be more prone to parent a child out of wedlock and to divorce, while fathers will be less
prone to do either. Which effect will dominate cannot be ascertained in general, but Nixon (1997) shows
that stronger enforcement is more likely to deter divorce among couples where the divorced wife would
rely on welfare. And Willis (1999) finds that in the presence of a shortage of males and relatively high
female income (which is produced by welfare), theory predicts that stronger enforcement reduces
nonmarital births. One simple though not quite full story is that among couples where the mother would
go on welfare if she had a nonmarital birth or divorced, welfare removes or at least reduces the benefit of
strong enforcement. Consequently, the effects of enforcement on the incomes of these mothers and fathers
is asymmetrical. In summary, previous explorations of economic theory predict that in conditions which
pertain in the United States today, stronger child support enforcement will reduce nonmarital births and
may reduce divorce. Further, there is empirical confirmation that stronger enforcement reduces marital
disruption (Nixon, 1997) and out-of-wedlock childbearing (Case, 1998; Plotnick et al., 1998; Blau, Kahn,
and Waldfogel, 1999; Garfinkel et al., 2000).6
In short, theory strongly suggests and empirical research confirms that strong child support
enforcement decreases welfare participation by increasing the income and economic security of single
mothers, which decreases entries of single mothers into (and increases exits from) welfare, and by
deterring single-motherhood via decreases in both nonmarital births and divorce. The total effect on
welfare caseloads could be quite substantial even if each of the individual effects were only small to
modest.
There is also a relatively large body of research devoted to predicting welfare participation and
welfare caseloads (see Moffitt, 1992, Blank, 1997, and Figlio and Ziliak, 1999, for thorough reviews). In
studies done in the 1980s, the focus was on the effects of welfare program characteristics on the
participation decision. Although the data and methods are different, the results across the studies are
remarkably consistent in showing that welfare participation is an economic decision. Higher caseloads are
associated with higher welfare benefits, and also with higher unemployment rates, lower wages, and other
sources of income (which include but are neither limited to nor dominated by child support). Women who
are less educated, older, in poorer health, and with more and younger children are more likely to
participate in welfare.
Welfare caseloads, as mentioned above, increased greatly in the early 1990s and then abruptly
decreased after 1994 during a period when guarantees and tax rates did not change much. Not
surprisingly, most studies in the 1990s shifted their focus to other matters, such as demographic,
macroeconomic, political, and AFDC program factors. Among the factors, strong macroeconomic
performance and welfare reform receive most credit for the changes. The Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA, 1997) used annual state-level panel data for 1976–1996 and modeled per capita AFDC
receipt—caseloads divided by state population—as a function of unemployment rates, welfare waivers,
and AFDC maximum benefit guarantees. The CEA study concluded that 44 percent of the decline in
welfare receipt from 1993 to 1996 could be attributed to economic growth and that 31 percent was related
to welfare waivers. Results from an updated paper (CEA, 1999) indicate that PRWORA has been a key7
contributor to the recent decline in caseloads. TANF accounts for one-third of caseload reduction from
1996 to 1998 while improvements in the labor market account for 8 to 10 percent. In the earlier years,
1993 to 1996, most of decline was due to the strong labor market while welfare waivers played a small
yet important role. Building on Blank’s work of 1997, Wallace and Blank (1999) used annual state data
for 1980–1996 and a rich set of control variables to examine the changes in welfare participation. They
found that caseloads are strongly affected by welfare waivers and by macroeconomic, programmatic, and
political factors. In the 1994–1996 simulation, economic factors contributed 47 percent of caseload
decline and welfare waivers accounted for 22 percent of the decline. Ziliak et al. (1997) argued that the
use of annual caseloads masks the importance of short-run dynamics in caseload levels and employed
monthly state-level data and a more dynamic specification to examine AFDC caseloads. They used
1987–1996 monthly data and attributed 78 percent of the decline to macroeconomic factors and only 6
percent to welfare waivers for the 26 states experiencing at least a 20 percent decline in AFDC caseloads
between 1993 and 1996. Figlio and Ziliak (1999) conducted an extensive reconciliation between the
findings in Ziliak et al. and those of the CEA, and concluded that these differences are largely due to the
fact that the CEA used a static model while Ziliak et al. employed a dynamic one, and that the primary
consequence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to reduce the role of welfare reform relative to the
macroeconomic role in generating the decline in AFDC caseloads. In their preferred specification (model
6, Table 2), Figlio and Ziliak attributed 75 percent of 1993–1996 decline in caseloads to macroeconomic
conditions, while the effect of welfare reform was negligible. Although the relative contributions of a
strong economy and welfare reform are in dispute, the results across studies are consistent in that both
factors underlie the decline in caseloads. However, in view of the strong theoretical and empirical
evidence that child support matters, it is surprising that these studies do not incorporate the effects of
changes in child support.8
III. METHODS
The primary analysis technique is fixed effects regression of welfare caseloads with welfare
caseloads as the dependent variable, and child support, demographic, economic, welfare, and political
variables as independent variables. Fixed effects models are run as ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions with state and year binary variables as the fixed effects. The model specification uses the
natural logarithm form and is given by:
ln yit = i + 1 * CSit + 2 * it + t + it (1)
where yit is welfare caseloads measured for state i at time t, i is the individual state effect (which is taken
to be constant over time), CS is a child support variable,  is a vector of demographic, economic, welfare,
and political variables, t is the time effect (which is taken to be constant across states),  is a regression
coefficient, and it is the cross-sectional time-series error component. Note that with state and year effects,
the only way in which a variable can influence the dependent variable is through its changes within a state
over time. Variables that are largely constant over time within states or affect all states in a given year,
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), will be subsumed within the state and year fixed effect.
In some models, we also control for state-specific time trends (i.e., the interaction of state
dummies and the linear time-trend variables). With state-specific time trends included, the only way an
independent variable (such as child support) can influence the dependent variable is through its deviation
from linear time trends in the state. Including state-specific time trends may introduce the problem of
“overcontrolling” for variables which trend up or down in a linear fashion (Blank, 1997). As with some
previous analyses of welfare caseloads, we also estimate dynamic versions of model 1 by including
lagged welfare caseloads as an independent variable.9
1As in other studies on this topic, we treat welfare benefit levels as exogenous in these models. We did test
for the exogeneity of welfare benefits using state political variables and the federal match rate as instruments, but for
the most part the results suggested that welfare could be treated as exogenous in models with state-specific time
trends, while in models without state-specific time trends, our instruments performed poorly.
The coefficient 1 in equation 1 may be biased if child support is endogenous.
1 States with high
caseloads have a greater incentive to enforce child support. Consequently, the error term of equation 1 is
correlated with child support collections, and OLS generates positively biased coefficients (Greene,
1993). To correct for this potential endogeneity, we remodel our equation as two-stage equations (2SLS):
CSit = i + 1 * Zit + 2 *  it + t + it (2-1)
ln yit = i + 1* p(CS)it + 2 * it + t + it (2-2)
where Z is the vector of instrumental variables and p(CS) is the predicted child support value.
Specifically, in the first stage, the endogenous variable, child support, is regressed on a set of instruments
and all the exogenous variables in order to get predicted values. The predicted CS is then used in the
second stage. Because the predicted CS is not correlated with the error term, it, it generates consistent
and efficient coefficients in the second stage, equation 2-2. As discussed in further detail below, we use
the ratio of the legislature that is female as an instrument. The female legislator ratio has been shown to
be an appropriate instrument for state child support policies which in turn affect child support
enforcement (Besley and Case, 1997; Case, 1998).
One difficulty with using the female legislator ratio is that it is reasonable to hypothesize that
female legislators also affect other government programs, such as the generosity of welfare and child
care, which affect welfare caseloads. Though we control for welfare benefit levels, good measures of state
child care expenditures over the entire period are not available, and there may be other omitted variables
that are positively associated with female legislators and negatively associated with welfare caseloads.
Thus, the predicted child support coefficient may overestimate the effect of child support on caseloads.
Consequently, the 2SLS estimates should be considered an upper bound estimate of the effects of child
support enforcement on welfare caseloads.10
To measure the strength of a state’s child support enforcement program, we calculate the average
child support payment per eligible family on welfare and the proportion of eligible families that receive
child support for each state each year, or payment rate. The average payment is the most comprehensive
measure of the strength of a state’s child support enforcement system because it captures the effects of (1)
the probability of establishing a legal child support obligation, (2) the dollar value of the obligation, and
(3) the degree to which the obligation is paid. Though average payments also inappropriately capture
differences in men’s earnings across states, this is not a problem for our analysis because we control for
differences in male earnings. As described below, however, reliable data on average payments are
available only for families that receive welfare. By way of contrast, there are reliable data on the
proportions of eligible families that receive some child support both for all single mothers and for only
mothers who received welfare. The payment rate, while not quite as comprehensive as average payments,
is still a very good measure of the strength of a state’s enforcement system because it reflects success at
both getting a child support award and securing a payment. From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear
whether the effectiveness of child support enforcement for all single mothers or only for single mothers
on welfare is the more important determinant of welfare caseloads. Thus, we try both measures. Other
measures of enforcement strength could be used. Nixon (1997), for example, used average payments and
three other measures besides the payment rate in her analysis of the effects of enforcement on divorce.
But she notes that the correlation between these five variables was .8 and found not surprisingly that the
results for all variables were quite similar.
Alternatively, the effects of child support laws or expenditures could be examined. Case (1998),
for example, analyzes the effects of a few child support laws (rather than practices) on nonmarital births,
and Freeman and Waldfogel (1998) examine the effects of the number of key state laws enacted and
expenditures on child support enforcement. Sorensen and Halpern (1999) investigate the effects of several
child support enforcement laws on child support receipt rate. We examine the effects of child support
outcomes or practices rather than laws or expenditures for two reasons. First, measuring the effects of11
2As a practical matter, a time series of data on laws and expenditures that would cover the entire period we
are interested in in this paper is not readily available. Freeman and Waldfogel had to restrict their analysis of laws
and expenditures to the 1981–1988 period only. Sorensen and Halpern cover a longer period, but their data are not
publicly available. Because we want to understand whether the omission of child support has biased previous studies
of welfare caseloads and because the reforms occurred in the mid-1990s, it is important that we have data that cover
this period.
individual laws is quite difficult, and the correct specification is unclear because child support payments
are a multiplicative function of the probability of having a legal obligation, the level of the obligation, and
the probability of paying the full obligation. Furthermore, each step in the enforcement process is affected
by more than one law. The probability of securing a child support obligation, for example, depends on a
number of laws, such as (1) admitting, and more recently requiring, blood and genetic tests in disputed
cases, (2) allowing paternity to be established any time before the child’s 18th birthday, and (3) requiring
that paternity be established for the father’s name to go on the birth certificate. Second, effective practices
are derived in part, but not in whole, from laws. Good laws that are not effectively enforced may have
little effect. Freeman and Waldfogel (1998) show that effective child support enforcement requires both
strong laws and high expenditures on enforcement. Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that welfare
caseloads will be more strongly related to effective enforcement practices than to laws per se.
2 Using
measures of child support payments has advantages, but there are disadvantages as well. Most important,
not all of the effects of child support laws on welfare caseloads operate indirectly through their effects on
child support payments. For example, laws that strengthen the requirements for mothers receiving
AFDC/TANF to cooperate with OCSE officials in establishing paternity and enforcing support could
deter mothers from applying for welfare even if the law had no effect on child support payments.
Similarly, laws strengthening paternity establishment could affect fathers’ marriage and fertility behavior
rather than payment behavior. To the extent that child support enforcement laws have these kinds of
direct effects on welfare caseloads independent of their indirect effects through payments, as above, the
coefficient 1 in equation 1 will underestimate the true effect of strong child support enforcement on
welfare caseloads.12
3Both measures have been analyzed and the results are robust. We also follow Blank (1997) in using
AFDC-Basic caseloads minus child-only caseloads as an alternative numerator for the dependent variable, and the
results are similar to those using AFDC-Basic caseloads.
IV. DATA
The data for this study came from several sources. In previous studies, welfare caseloads have
been defined as AFDC-Basic caseloads divided by the state population or by the female population aged
15–44. Although both measures adjust for state size, the latter is preferred because it takes account of the
size of the population at risk in that state, and therefore we follow it here.
3 AFDC-Basic caseloads from
1980 to 1996 come from Quarterly Public Assistance Statistics (QPAS). State female population aged
15–44 comes from 1980–1996 CPS.
As discussed above, the key independent variable, the strength of the state’s child support
enforcement system, is measured alternatively as (1) the average child support payment for families on
welfare, (2) the payment rate for families on welfare, and (3) the payment rate for all single-parent
families. The data for these child support variables come from three different sources. We use the average
child support payment to AFDC cases and the number of AFDC cases with child support payments as
reported by the OCSE divided by the number of AFDC-Basic caseloads from QPAS to measure,
respectively, the average payment for families on welfare and the proportion of single mothers on welfare
with child support payments. The OCSE data are not reliable for tracking payments to all families eligible
for child support. Federal child support law requires state offices of child support enforcement to provide
services to all welfare families and to offer to provide services to nonwelfare families. States differ in the
extent to which they incorporate nonwelfare cases into their administrative systems. Over time, however,
virtually all states have brought an increasing proportion of all eligible families into their state OCSE
systems. Thus a large part of the difference between states and over time in OCSE collections for
nonwelfare families is a result of counting more families in one state than another and over time where13
child support was already being paid. Consequently we do not use the OCSE data to measure payments to
all eligible families. Instead, we use the March CPS from 1979 to 1997 to construct state-by-year
measures of both the percentage of single mothers with child support payments and the percentage of
single mothers on welfare with child support payments. We do not use the CPS data to construct
measures of payment amounts because, although the CPS collected data on whether any child support was
received by 1980, data on the amount of child support received was not broken out from other sources
until 1989.
The major weaknesses of the CPS measures are the small sample size of single mothers in many
states and the problem of underreporting of welfare receipt. Sample sizes are smallest and sampling error
greatest for the proportion of welfare cases receiving child support. The underreporting of welfare receipt
in the CPS is a well-known problem that leads to difficulty in accurately identifying people receiving
welfare. In addition welfare recipients may underreport receipt of child support because they receive at
most $50 per month in child support and the payment comes not as a separate check but as an addition to
their welfare check. On the other hand, the OCSE administrative data are subject to various kinds of
reporting error (Guyer, Miller, and Garfinkel, 1996). Most important, for the AFDC payment rate, it is
possible that states report payments to former welfare cases as payments to welfare cases. Though the
data-matching capabilities of state offices of welfare and child support enforcement have improved over
time, this type of error is still likely to occur, especially since federal law gives state offices of child
support greater incentives for collecting from AFDC than non-AFDC cases. Because the OCSE-based
measure is not subject to sampling error, we have more confidence in it for the state-by-year analyses. We
are less confident that it is superior to the CPS in measuring the absolute level of the national proportion
of welfare cases with payments in any particular year. Which is the better measure of the national level
would make a good statistical note and be of use to policymakers, but is beyond the scope of this study.
Finally, to reduce the impact of sampling and reporting error, we use 3-year moving averages for all three
measures of child support enforcement rigor.14
For welfare variables, AFDC maximum benefits for a four-person family were collected from the
Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, various years). Average
Medicaid expenditures for a family with one adult and two children came from Blank (1997), who
obtained them from the Health Care Financing Administration. The welfare waivers used in this study
include the approval dates of any major waivers that (1) require work, (2) impose time limits on benefits,
or (3) provide work incentives. Data for these variables came from Ziliak et al. (1997). We created a
dummy variable to indicate whether a state had at least one major waiver (related to work, time limits, or
work incentives) approved by federal government by the survey year.
Information on state-level demographics came mainly from the Census Bureau and the CPS.
Values for the intercensal years were interpolated from 1980 and 1990 censuses, and values for 1991
through 1996 were updated by 1991 and 1996 CPS. Demographic data include the percentage of the
population that is black, the percentage that is elderly, and the percentage with less than high school
education. The number of newly arrived immigrants is available from 1980 to 1995 from the Statistical
Yearbook of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. Male and female 10th percentile and
median wages were computed from the CPS. Unemployment rates were taken from the Census Bureau’s
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Political variables include the party affiliation of the governor, the majority party of the state
House and state Senate, and the female legislator ratio (i.e., the number of female legislators in the state
House and Senate divided by total number of legislators), obtained from The Book of States, published by
the Council of State Governments.
We use annual data because our CPS figures and some aggregate data are only available at the
annual level. Data were complete for every variable for each state and year. The final sample consists of
867 observations—50 states plus the District of Columbia for 17 years, 1980 through 1996. Variables
expressed in dollars were collected as nominal amounts and converted to real (constant) 1996 dollars
using the consumer price index.15
V. RESULTS
Descriptive Results
Means and standard deviations of the main analysis variables are listed in Table 1; Table A1
provides the same information for the other analysis variables. In 1980, the mean welfare caseload
rate—a state’s welfare caseload divided by its female population aged 15–44—was 6.3 percent, with a
standard deviation of 2.5 suggesting substantial variation across states. This proportion dips to about 5.5
percent in 1984 and 1988, increases in response to the recession in the early 1990s to 6.8 percent in 1992,
and falls back to 6.2 percent in 1996. The rate is affected both by the proportion of females who are single
mothers and by the proportion of single mothers who participate in welfare, and the trends in these
variables are quite different. The proportion of females who are single mothers increases steadily, but at a
decreasing rate, from 11.6 percent in 1980, to 13.7 percent in 1984, 14.2 percent in 1988, 15.1 percent in
1992, and 16.3 percent in 1996. By way of contrast, the proportion of single mothers who receive welfare
declines over the period, except for periods of recession—from 54 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1984,
39 percent in 1988, back up to 45 percent in 1992, and then back down to 38 percent in 1996. Finally, the
proportion of single mothers with child support payments is 28 percent in 1980, dips to 27 percent in
1984, and then increases steadily to 31 percent in 1988, 32 percent in 1992, and 35 percent in 1996. As
described above, even more striking is the increase between 1980 and 1996 in the proportion of single
mothers on welfare who receive child support. The proportion, derived from CPS data, increased from 8.8
percent to 26.2 percent; based on OCSE data, the proportion increased even more, from 14.7 percent to
42.3 percent. The increase in average payments for families on welfare is impressive as well, from $346
in 1980 to $811 in 1996. As discussed above, the improvement in child support enforcement for single
mothers on welfare is clear.
The time trends in Table 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that improvements in child support
enforcement have led to decreases in welfare caseloads by reducing the rate of growth of singleVariable 1980–96 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
Welfare Caseloads / Female Population Aged 15–44 6.01 6.32 5.51 5.45 6.78 6.18
(2.12) (2.53) (2.04) (1.80) (1.93) (2.19)
Single Mothers / Female Population Aged 15–44 14.30 11.58 13.74 14.19 15.11 16.31
(3.28) (2.39) (2.68) (3.19) (3.12) (3.71)
Welfare Caseloads / Single Mothers 42.33 54.15 39.87 38.71 45.30 38.24
  (11.97) (15.97) (10.94) (10.48) (10.52) (10.70)
CPS Payment Rate for All Single-Mother Families 
a 30.21 27.57 26.64 30.68 31.59 34.54
  (7.78) (7.17) (6.04) (8.49) (7.89) (8.59)
CPS Payment Rate for Families on Welfare 
b 16.57 8.81 8.46 18.50 19.47 26.23
  (10.49) (6.43) (4.94) (10.65) (7.79) (13.17)
OCSE Payment Rate for Families on Welfare 
c 27.04 14.66 21.31 27.79 31.00 42.32
  (15.26) (8.23) (11.02) (12.56) (14.32) (20.66)
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare 
d 0.596 0.346 0.500 0.638 0.679 0.811
  (0.314) (0.228) (0.266) (0.293) (0.284) (0.354)
Notes: Unit is state. Standard errors are in parentheses.
cOCSE-reported AFDC cases with child support payments divided by administrative caseloads data.
dOCSE-reported total child support collection amount from AFDC cases divided by administrative caseloads data. $1,000 real 1996 dollars.
TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Main Variables
aNumber of single-mother families with child support payments divided by number of single-mother families, both from CPS. 
bNumber of single-mother families on welfare with child support payments divided by number of single-mother families on welfare, both from CPS.17
4The differences between Blank’s model and our model are (1) the percentage of households headed by
single mothers is not included because female headship may be endogenous to, or influenced by, both AFDC benefit
levels and, more important for our purposes, child support enforcement, (2) gender is taken into account in wage
variables and we use 10th rather than 20th wage percentile, and (3) the proportion of people with less than a high
school education is used rather than years of education in Blank’s model.
motherhood and by providing an alternative source of support to single mothers. Figures 1, 2, and 3
explore further the relationship between child support and welfare caseloads over time and across states.
Figure 1 displays the aggregate trends in welfare caseloads and the OCSE-based measure of average
payment for families on welfare. Welfare caseloads declined in the early 1980s, remained stable between
1982 and 1989, increased again in the early 1990s, and began an unprecedented decrease after 1994. On
the other hand, the OCSE average payment measure shows substantial increase over the period, as do the
other three measures of child support. Figures 2-1 to 2-4 present the relationship between welfare
caseloads and the four measures of child support over time and across states. The negative relationship
between welfare caseloads and child support is evident from the figures, with correlation coefficients
ranging from .20 to .51. Figure 3 displays the relationship between percentage changes in the OCSE-
based measure of average payments for families on welfare and the changes in welfare caseloads levels
(r = .31). The relationship is also strong for OCSE payment rate for families on welfare (r = .45)
(although perhaps due to sampling error, there is virtually no relationship between the changes in the
CPS-based measures and the changes in welfare caseloads). The relationship between the OCSE measures
and welfare caseloads is even stronger in the later period. The correlation coefficient, for example,
between percentage changes in the OCSE-based measure of average payments and welfare caseloads in
the 1993–1996 period is .50. We use multivariate analyses to explore these relationships further in the
next section.
OLS Regression Results
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the 1980–1996 period from OLS regressions.










































Figure 2-1: Welfare Caseloads Versus OCSE Average Payment, 1980-96
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Figure 2-2: Welfare Caseloads Versus OCSE Payment Rate, 1980-96
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Figure 2-3: Welfare Caseloads Versus CPS Payment Rate, 1980-96
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Figure 2-4: Welfare Caseloads Versus CPS AFDC Payment Rate, 1980-96
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Figure 3: Percentage Change in Welfare Caseloads and in OCSE Average 
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sRobust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Variable Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P
Welfare Caseloads, t-1 — —   — — — —   — — 0.892 0.017 *** 0.792 0.027 ***
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare — —   — — -0.272 0.045 *** -0.398 0.056 *** -0.064 0.023 *** -0.167 0.032 ***
Unemployment Rate 1.406 0.537 *** 1.784 0.354 *** 1.410 0.528 *** 1.373 0.339 *** 1.243 0.222 *** 1.283 0.223 ***
Unemployment Rate, t-1  1.358 0.587 ** 1.351 0.389 *** 1.207 0.572 ** 0.989 0.357 *** 0.272 0.235 0.364 0.233
Unemployment Rate, t-2 2.680 0.482 *** 1.705 0.323 *** 2.405 0.458 *** 1.445 0.299 *** -0.069 0.182 0.108 0.174
Log (Male 10th Wage Percentile) [$ real 1996] -0.035 0.056 -0.120 0.042 *** 0.006 0.055 -0.118 0.040 *** -0.008 0.022 -0.031 0.022
Log (Female 10th Wage Percentile) [$ real 1996] -0.163 0.068 ** -0.138 0.044 *** -0.148 0.067 ** -0.134 0.042 *** -0.005 0.026 -0.020 0.026
Log (Male Median Wage) [$ real 1996] -0.291 0.091 *** -0.080 0.070 -0.311 0.090 *** -0.072 0.069 0.002 0.034 0.034 0.038
Log (Female Median Wage) [$ real 1996] -0.321 0.105 *** -0.021 0.077 -0.420 0.101 *** -0.032 0.074 -0.033 0.036 0.016 0.036
Log (Yearly Maximum AFDC Benefit Level [$ real 1996] )  0.337 0.073 *** 0.187 0.058 *** 0.337 0.066 *** 0.152 0.057 *** 0.233 0.026 *** 0.193 0.033 ***
Log (Yearly Medicaid benefit Level [$ real 1996] )  0.013 0.017 -0.001 0.013 0.024 0.014 * 0.005 0.012 -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.005
Any Major Waiver -0.081 0.023 *** -0.055 0.014 *** -0.080 0.022 *** -0.047 0.013 *** -0.015 0.007 ** -0.005 0.007
Republican Governor -0.053 0.010 *** -0.034 0.007 *** -0.056 0.009 *** -0.033 0.007 *** -0.017 0.004 *** -0.012 0.004 ***
Both Major Party in State Senate and House is Republican -0.028 0.019 -0.023 0.014 -0.037 0.019 * -0.026 0.014 * -0.006 0.008 -0.009 0.008
Both Major Party in State Senate and House is Democrat 0.007 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.018 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.006
Percent Elderly -0.247 0.559 0.884 1.498 -0.676 0.572 0.664 1.366 -0.770 0.215 *** -0.414 0.758
Percent Black -0.849 0.722 1.479 1.444 -0.756 0.794 1.136 1.364 -1.004 0.303 *** -1.124 0.688
Percent with Less Than High School Education 1.338 0.364 *** 0.496 0.325 1.306 0.356 *** 0.499 0.296 * 0.131 0.116 0.191 0.155
Percent Immigrants t-1 -0.976 4.353 -1.788 2.700 -2.046 4.159 -1.965 2.611 0.875 1.771 0.451 1.651
Percent Immigrants t-2 1.037 4.962 -2.035 2.884 -0.700 4.759 -0.179 2.944 -1.509 1.415 -0.412 1.456


















Model 3 Model 4
Yes
TABLE 2
Dependent Variable:  Log (Administrative AFDC-Basic Caseload/Female Population Aged 15–44)
OLS Welfare Caseloads Models with and without Child Support, 1980–1996
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.
No Yes
0.989 0.991
Model 5 Model 6
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results for model 1 are similar to Blank’s. Unemployment has a strong and long-term effect on caseloads.
A 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate in the current year would raise the caseload share by 1.4
percent in the current year, another 1.4 percent in the next year, and 2.7 percent in the second following
year. The total effect of a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment rate on caseloads would be 5.5
percent. This number is in the middle of previous estimates—higher than Blank’s 3.8 percent (1997,
Table 2, column 1), Ziliak’s 4.1 percent (1997, Table 5, column 1), and CEA’s 4.7 percent (1997, Table
2, column 1), but lower than Wallace and Blank’s 6.0 percent (1999, Table 2, column 2). The difference
may due to data period and/or model specification.
As expected, better employment prospects as measured by the male and female 10th percentile
and median wages reduce welfare caseloads. A 10 percent increase in the female 10th percentile wage (an
increase of around 49 cents) would lead to a 1.6 percent decrease in caseloads, and a 10 percent increase
in the male and female median wage (increases of around $1.5 and $1, respectively) would reduce
caseloads by 2.9 and 3.2 percent, respectively. This result makes sense since an increase in the wage for a
low-income woman has a direct effect on her income, which decreases her probability of being on
welfare; an increase in the male median wage raises a man’s marriage prospects, which indirectly reduces
caseloads by increasing marriage.
States with more generous benefits have higher welfare caseloads. A 1 percent increase in AFDC
benefits will increase caseloads by 0.34 percent. Having a welfare waiver, however, significantly reduces
caseloads. States with any major welfare waiver reduce their caseloads by 8.1 percent. The magnitude of
welfare waivers is at the low end of previous estimates—similar to Wallace and Blank’s estimate (1999,
Table 2, column 2), but lower than Blank’s 10.7 percent (1997, Table 2, column 1), Ziliak’s 9.1 percent
(1997, Table 5, column 1), and CEA’s 9.4 percent (1997, Table 2, column 1).
Political variables matter, too. Having a Republican governor and having both state legislative
chambers controlled by Republicans substantially reduces caseloads by 5.3 and 2.8 percent, respectively.
These findings suggest that Republican governors and legislators are able to shape administrative23
5Some may argue that part of the child support effect reflects the different proportions of never-married
mothers across states because states with more never-married mothers might have higher caseloads and fewer child
support collections. Because the proportion of never-married mothers is endogenous to our main model, we do not
include it in our models. However, the coefficient of child support increases, rather than decreases, to .29 in model
3 and to .40 in model 4 after controlling for the proportion of never-married mothers. We think this is because the
effect of never-married mothers on caseloads (r=.53) is much stronger than on child support (r=.23), which leads to
the estimated coefficient of child support being positively biased.
processes to lower caseloads. Finally, for demographic variables, proportions of the population with less
than a high school education are significantly and positively associated with caseloads.
Model 2 is the same as model 1 except for the addition of state-specific time trends. As expected,
including state time trends reduces the magnitude of most of the estimated coefficients. An exception is
the male 10th percentile wage, which becomes significant, while the effect of the female 10th percentile
wage still holds, and both male and female median wages become insignificant. The magnitude of the
AFDC benefits coefficient is reduced by half but is still significant.
Models 3 and 4 are the same as models 1 and 2 except that our best measure of the main
independent variable, the average payment for families on welfare as reported by OCSE, is added. (The
results for the other three measures of child support are reported in Table 3.) The child support
coefficients are negative and significantly different from zero in the models both with and without state-
specific time trends. A $100 dollar increase in child support payments would reduce caseloads by 0.27
percent in model 3 and by 0.40 percent in model 4.
5 Including state child support collection does not
notably change the findings from models 1 and 2. All the variables that were significant in models 1 and 2
still hold their significance in models 3 and 4. This suggests that models that omit child support collection
may not yield greatly biased coefficients. (We explore this issue in more detail below.)
Models 5 and 6 are identical to models 3 and 4, respectively, except that the lagged value of
welfare caseloads is included as an independent variable. The most notable result is that both child
support coefficients remain significantly different from zero, but decline significantly. Also, the child
support coefficients are larger when state-specific time trends are included. The effect of welfare waivers24
also decreases substantially and is no longer significant in model 6. The lagged values of unemployment
rates are no longer significant as well.
Table 3 presents OLS child support coefficients for alternative measures of child support from
models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2. In addition to the OCSE-based measure of average payments per welfare
family, results are presented for the other three measures of the strength of the state’s child support
enforcement regime: the OCSE-based measure of payment rates for welfare families and the CPS-based
measures of payment rates for welfare families and for all single-mother families. All of the OCSE-based
measures are negative and significantly different from zero. The CPS-based measures, by contrast, are
weaker. Though both are negative and significantly different from zero in model 3, neither is significantly
different from zero in any of the other models and even have the wrong sign in the models with lagged
caseloads. The weaker results for the CPS-based measures are consistent with the hypothesis that these
variables are measured with more error.
2SLS Regression Results
As discussed above, child support payments may be endogenous to welfare participation. In
particular, child support enforcement is expected to have a negative effect on caseloads, but states with
higher caseloads might have a greater incentive to enforce child support. If states with higher caseloads
do devote more effort to enforcement, this will introduce a positive association between enforcement and
caseloads, or a positive bias in the child support collection coefficient. To test this, we use the proportion
of female state legislators and that number squared as the instrument for child support. Three-year lags
are used for the proportion of female legislators to capture the time difference between legislation and
implementation. The first stage of 2SLS for the CPS child support payment rate is displayed in Table A2.
In models both with and without state time trends, the square of the female legislator ratio is significantly
positive and has a much stronger effect than the female legislator ratio has on the proportion of single
mothers with child support payments. The findings suggest that the presence of women in stateVariable Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare -0.272 *** -0.398 *** -0.064 *** -0.167 ***
(0.045) (0.056) (0.023) (0.032)
OCSE Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.321 *** -0.335 *** -0.064 ** -0.162 ***
(0.062) (0.079) (0.026) (0.043)
CPS Payment Rate for All Single-Mother Families -0.471 *** -0.034 -0.041 0.024
(0.088) (0.077) (0.033) (0.038)
CPS Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.212 *** -0.037 0.013 0.030  
(0.065) (0.054) (0.026) (0.028)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 3 
Child Support Coefficients from OLS Welfare Caseloads Models
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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legislatures has a positive effect on state child support policy, and the effect increases more than
proportionally as the proportion of female legislators increases. (The results remain significant, but are a
bit weaker, if we exclude the squared term.) 
In results not presented in tables, we found that the proportion of female state legislators is
positively and significantly (at the .05 level) related to all four measures of child support in models
without state time trends and to both CPS-based measures in models with state time trends. The female
state legislator coefficients are positive but significant at only the .07 and .22 levels for the OCSE-based
payments amount and payment rates measures in models with state time trends. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker
(1995) indicate that if the instrument is only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, even a small
correlation between the instrument and the error term in the second stage can seriously bias estimates.
The correlation between the female legislator ratio (t3) and our four child support measures ranges from
.41 to .50 (p < .001), and the correlation between female legislator ratio (t3) and error terms in the
second equations are near zero, ranging from .003 to .01. This suggests that the female legislator ratio
(t3) is a good candidate for an instrument. Still, as suggested above, omitted variables bias may produce
upwardly biased estimates.
Finally, we employ two tests of whether child support enforcement is endogenous. In the first
test, we regress caseloads against our observed child support measures and the error terms from the first
stage regressions. The error terms are significantly related to caseloads when the CPS-based, but not the
OCSE-based, measures of enforcement are used. All the error terms are in the positive direction except
OCSE average payments per welfare family. The relationship between the error terms and caseloads
provides some evidence that child support payment rates carry positive bias. The second test is a
Hausman (1978) test to examine whether the coefficients between OLS and 2SLS are significantly
different. This test provides evidence of endogeneity for all three measures of payment rate, but not for
the OCSE-based measure of average payments for families on welfare.27
6The 2SLS child support coefficients generally decrease if we only use a single instrument—female
legislator ratio—but the coefficients increase in some models. For example, the 2SLS coefficient of CPS payment
rate for welfare mothers decreases from 0.66 to 0.20 in model 3, and from 0.18 to 0.04 in model 5, but the
coefficients increase from .058 to 1.85 in model 4 and from .10 to 2.02 in model 6. We prefer models that
include the square of female legislator ratio as an instrument because the female legislator ratio may not work in a
linear way and because it fits the data better.
The top panel of Table 4 presents the child support coefficients from the second stage of 2SLS
estimates for the four alternative measures of the strength of child support and the four different models;
the comparable OLS coefficients from Table 3 are presented in the bottom panel. As is the case with
many instrumental variables models, the standard errors are large, and only four of the 16 coefficients are
statistically significant. The most noteworthy result in Table 4 is that all of the 2SLS child support
coefficients are negative and, with two exceptions, all are larger in absolute magnitude than the OLS
coefficients.
6 Although for the most part they are not statistically significant, these results suggest that
states with higher caseloads have done more to enforce child support or that the 2SLS coefficients are
upwardly biased because of an omitted variables problem. Not surprisingly in view of the endogeneity
test described above, the coefficients of the CPS-based measures increase the most. For similar reasons, it
is also not surprising that the OCSE measure of average payments to welfare mothers changes the least.
Given the conceptual superiority of the OCSE average payment measure, the absence of sampling error
with this variable, the results of the tests of endogeneity, and the results reported in Tables 3 and 4, we
place the most confidence in the OLS results for this variable. Finally, the OCSE average payment
measure, taken in conjunction with the change in this measure over the 1980–1996 period, suggests that
increases in child support enforcement led to reductions in AFDC caseloads in 1996 by 12 to 17 percent.
Simulations of the Relative Importance of Child Support Enforcement
To test of the importance of child support in explaining recent caseload declines, we used the
results from models 1 and 2 in Table 2 to simulate the effects of improvements in unemployment rates
and welfare waivers on caseload changes between 1994 and 1996. These results replicate previousCoef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P
2SLS Estimation
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare -0.259 * -0.397 -0.077   -0.017
(0.146) (0.623) (0.060) (0.420)
OCSE Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.419 -2.594 -0.130   -0.948
(0.284) (1.773) (0.120) (1.310)
CPS Payment Rate for All Single-Mother Families -1.010 -1.236 * -0.269   -0.173
(0.676) (0.764) (0.275) (0.299)
CPS Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.661 * -0.579 * -0.180   -0.104  
(0.350) (0.297) (0.134) (0.139)
OLS Estimation
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare -0.272 *** -0.398 *** -0.064 *** -0.167 ***
(0.045) (0.056) (0.023) (0.032)
OCSE Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.321 *** -0.335 *** -0.064 ** -0.162 ***
(0.062) (0.079) (0.026) (0.043)
CPS Payment Rate for All Single-Mother Families -0.471 *** -0.034 -0.041 0.024
(0.088) (0.077) (0.033) (0.038)
CPS Payment Rate for Families on Welfare -0.212 *** -0.037 0.013 0.030  
(0.065) (0.054) (0.026) (0.028)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 4 
Comparison of Child Support Coefficients between OLS and 2SLS Estimations
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.  
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable
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7For the method of dynamic simulation, see Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio (2000).
analyses that omit child support. Then we used the results from models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2 that are
based on our preferred measure of child support to simulate the effects of improvements in
unemployment rates, welfare waivers, and improvements in child support. Table 5 presents the simulation
results. Based on the estimated results of model 1, unemployment rates and welfare waivers explain 42
and 30 percent of caseload decline, respectively. When we use the model with state-specific time trends,
the effect of unemployment rates decreases to 34 percent and the effect of welfare decreases to 20
percent. After we take child support into account (models 3 and 4), child support on its own explains 17
to 24 percent of the caseload decline; welfare waivers decline to between 17 to 29 percent and
unemployment rates decline to 27 to 38 percent. In dynamic simulations
7 (models 5 and 6), child support
explains 23 to 60 percent of the caseload decline; welfare factors decline to between 5 and 15 percent and
unemployment rates explain about 29 percent. The fact that the share explained by welfare waivers and
unemployment rates declines after including child support suggests that some of the decline in welfare
caseloads attributed to welfare waivers and unemployment rates in previous studies is probably due to the
improvement of child support.
VI. CONCLUSION
Previous research on the determinants of welfare caseloads has not incorporated the effects of
child support. This is regrettable because legislators passed laws to strengthen enforcement with the
expectation that stronger child support enforcement would reduce welfare costs and caseloads.
Furthermore, their expectations were not unreasonable because there are good theoretical reasons and
relatively strong empirical support for the belief that strong enforcement reduces welfare caseloads by
deterring entrances into and promoting exits from welfare and by deterring divorce and nonmarital births.
Finally, child support enforcement among welfare families has improved dramatically in recent years.% Change  % Explained by
1994 1996 wrt/ 94 Independent Vars.
Observed: Caseloads / Female Population Aged 15–44 0.0700 0.0618 -11.71%
Predicted Value Based on:
Model 1 (w/o state time trends)
Unemployment Rate 0.0666 -4.87% 41.59%
Welfare Waiver 0.0676 -3.46% 29.51%
Model 2 (w/ state time trends)
Unemployment Rate 0.0672 -4.00% 34.15%
Welfare Waiver 0.0684 -2.36% 20.12%
Model 3 (w/o state time trends)
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare 0.0686 -1.97% 16.78%
Unemployment Rate 0.0669 -4.43% 37.80%
Welfare Waiver 0.0676 -3.43% 29.27%
Model 4 (w/ state time trends)
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare 0.0680 -2.86% 24.39%
Unemployment Rate 0.0678 -3.17% 27.07%
Welfare Waiver 0.0686 -1.99% 17.02%
Model 5 (w/o state time trends)
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare 0.0681 -2.71% 23.17%
Unemployment Rate 0.0676 -3.43% 29.27%
Welfare Waiver 0.0688 -1.71% 14.63%
Model 6 (w/ state time trends)
OCSE Average Payment for Families on Welfare 0.0651 -7.00% 59.76%
Unemployment Rate 0.0677 -3.29% 28.05%
Welfare Waiver 0.0696 -0.57% 4.88%
TABLE 5
Simulation of Recent Caseload Changes31
Employing annual state panel data from 1980 to 1996 to examine the effects of child support
enforcement on welfare caseloads, this paper provides evidence that child support plays a moderate to
large, and hitherto unrecognized, role in reducing welfare caseloads. Specifically, depending on the
model, our estimates imply that the improvement in child support collection between 1980 and 1996
reduced welfare caseloads by 12 to 17 percent in 1996. Without the improvement of child support
collection over the period, the mean welfare participation rate in 1996 would have been between 7.02 and
7.45 rather than the actual 6.18. In the 1994–1996 simulation, child support on its own explains 17 to 60
percent of the caseload decline. The inclusion of child support largely improves the ability to explain the
change in welfare caseloads that would not be explained by welfare and/or economic factors alone,
although it also somewhat decreases the estimated effect of those other factors.
After the 1996 welfare reform, national caseloads decreased by 30 percent, from 4.1 million in
1996 to 2.9 million in 1998. This dramatic decrease is expected to bring a new round of caseload studies
and studies of the well-being of single mothers after welfare. This paper provides evidence that, in
addition to the strong effects of the economy and welfare reform, the effect of child support on reducing
caseloads is substantial and significant and thus cannot be overlooked in caseload studies. Studying the
effects of child support on welfare caseloads is also particularly timely in light of recent changes in child
support policy at the national level. For instance, the 1996 welfare reform law gave states the option to
eliminate the $50 pass-through to mothers on welfare for whom child support is being collected. This
change may affect mothers’ willingness to cooperate with child support enforcement, which might
increase welfare caseloads in the long run, but it may also decrease their incentive to be on welfare, which
should decrease caseloads in the short run. These and other effects of the 1996 child support reforms will
be important to study in the years to come.     Variable 1980–96 1980 1988 1996
Unemployment Rate 6.60 6.77 5.48 5.21
  (2.19) (1.62) (1.89) (1.24)
Male 10th Wage Percentile [$ real 1996] 6.77 7.73 6.76 6.35
  (1.07) (1.18) (1.18) (0.76)
Male Median Wage [$ real 1996] 14.70 15.82 15.05 13.67
  (2.10) (2.38) (2.29) (1.66)
Female 10th Wage Percentile [$ real 1996] 4.93 5.11 4.91 4.91
  (0.62) (0.61) (0.70) (0.56)
Female Median Wage [$ real 1996] 9.80 9.41 9.99 10.17
  (1.48) (1.44) (1.63) (1.34)
State Population [1,000] 4,827 4,443 4,815 5,202
  (5264) (4703) (5269) (5793)
Female Population Aged 15–44 [1,000] 1,120 1,037 1,138 1,166
  (1231) (1107) (1271) (1307)
Single Mothers [1,000] 166 128 164 196
  (188) (148) (182) (226)
Yearly Maximum AFDC Benefit Level [$ 1,000 real 1996] 6.615 7.985 6.714 5.631
(2.482) (2.780) (2.373) (2.098)
Yearly Medicaid Benefit Level [$1,000 real 1996]   3.747 3.644 3.615 3.977
(1.049) (1.046) (1.057) (1.387)
Any Major Welfare Waiver 10.73 0.00 0.00 74.51
  (30.97) (0) (0) (44.01)
Party of Governor (Republican=1) 41.29 37.25 47.06 60.78
  (49.26) (48.83) (50.41) (49.31)
Republican Is Major Party of Both State Senate and House 19.38 21.57 17.65 37.25
  (39.55) (41.54) (38.50) (48.83)
Democrat Is Major Party of Both State Senate and House 61.25 70.59 62.75 41.18
  (48.75) (46.02) (48.83) (49.71)
Percent Black 10.73 10.39 10.57 11.10
  (12.00) (12.53) (12.21) (12.02)
Percent Elderly 12.51 10.95 12.54 14.02
(2.41) (2.14) (2.17) (2.72)
Percent with Less Than High School Education 25.00 32.75 25.89 17.19
  (8.06) (7.66) (5.91) (4.88)
Percent of Female-Headed Families 10.83 10.35 11.29 10.50
(2.54) (2.49) (2.52) (3.01)
New Immigrants [1,000] 16 10 12  N. A.
  (50) (23) (31)  N. A.
Female Legislator Ratio 15.96 9.82 15.36 20.69
(7.74) (5.57) (6.79) (7.32)
Notes: Unit is state. Standard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE A1
Means and Standard Deviations of Analysis VariablesVariable Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P
Female Legislator Ratio, t-3 -0.127 0.147 -0.457 0.203 **
Square of Female Legislator Ratio, t-3 0.888 0.347 ** 1.683 0.539 ***
Unemployment Rate -0.258 0.192 -0.357 0.181 **
Unemployment Rate, t-1 -0.201 0.232 -0.226 0.207
Unemployment Rate, t-2 -0.087 0.187 0.108 0.175
Log (Male 10th Wage Percentile) [$ real 1996] -0.017 0.023 -0.020 0.022
Log (Female 10th Wage Percentile) [$ real 1996] 0.002 0.027 -0.002 0.025
Log (Male Median Wage) [$ real 1996] 0.078 0.035 ** 0.063 0.035 *
Log (Female Median Wage) [$ real 1996] -0.057 0.038 -0.076 0.037 **
Log (Yearly Maximum AFDC Benefit)  -0.003 0.024 0.028 0.028
Log (Yearly Medicaid Benefit Level [$ real 1996] )  -0.013 0.006 ** 0.002 0.007
Any Major Waiver 0.026 0.007 0.013 0.008
Republican Governor 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Major Party in State Senate and House is Republican -0.029 0.007 *** -0.010 0.007
Major Party in State Senate and House is Democrat 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.006
Percent Elderly 0.516 0.205 ** -0.355 0.548
Percent Black -0.316 0.443 0.803 0.784
Percent with Less Than High School Education -0.230 0.123 * 0.164 0.178
Percent Immigrants, t-1 -1.986 1.749 -2.069 1.575
Percent Immigrants, t-2 -0.154 1.806 1.382 1.684
Stae and Year Effects
State Time Trends




Single Mothers with Child Support Payments Regression
* significant at 10 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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